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    <title type="text">The Bernard Law Firm </title>
    <subtitle type="text">The Bernard Law Firm</subtitle>

    <updated>2026-02-27T10:39:36Z</updated>

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        <entry>
            <author>
									                    <name>by The Bernard Law Firm</name>
				            </author>
            <title type="html"><![CDATA[An Employer May Be Liable if it Fires an Employee Based on the Employee’s Religious Beliefs or if the Employer Fails to Accommodate an Employee’s Religion]]></title>
            <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://www.bernardlaw.com/blog/2022/02/an-employer-may-be-liable-if-it-fires-an-employee-based-on-the-employees-religious-beliefs-or-if-the-employer-fails-to-accommodate-an-employees-religion/" />
            <id>https://www.bernardlaw.com/?p=47359</id>
            <updated>2021-11-30T16:23:56Z</updated>
            <published>2022-02-07T16:22:04Z</published>
					<taxo:topics><![CDATA[-]]></taxo:topics>
            <summary type="html"><![CDATA[Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee on the basis of religion. “Religion” is defined broadly to mean “all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief.” Assuming there is no “direct evidence” of religious discrimination, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has held in order to establish a prima facie claim of religious discrimination…]]></summary>
			                <content type="html" xml:base="https://www.bernardlaw.com/blog/2022/02/an-employer-may-be-liable-if-it-fires-an-employee-based-on-the-employees-religious-beliefs-or-if-the-employer-fails-to-accommodate-an-employees-religion/"><![CDATA[Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee on the basis of religion. "Religion" is defined broadly to mean "all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief."

Assuming there is no “direct evidence” of religious discrimination, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has held in order to establish a <em>prima facie </em>claim of religious discrimination under Title VII based on circumstantial ("indirect") evidence, the employee must demonstrate that: (1) the employee was a member of a protected class, (2) the employee was subjected to an adverse employment action, (3) the employee was qualified for the position, and (4) the employee was replaced by a person outside of the protected class or was treated differently than similarly situated employees. An employee can also bring an action for failure to accommodate a religion. In order to pursue a failure to accommodate religion claim, the Sixth Circuit has held an employee needs to show that he or she: (1) holds a sincere religious belief that conflicts with an employment requirement; (2) informed the employer about the conflict; and (3) he or she was discharged or disciplined for failing to comply with the conflicting employment requirement.

If the employee shows a <em>prima facie</em> case of religious discrimination, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason(s) for the adverse employment action. If the employer does so, then the employee must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the stated reasons were a pretext or cover up for discrimination.

To determine if you have a claim for religious discrimination, call Dale Bernard at 440-546-7500.]]></content>
						        </entry>
	        <entry>
            <author>
									                    <name>by The Bernard Law Firm</name>
				            </author>
            <title type="html"><![CDATA[Discrimination Based on Accent Can Be National Origin Discrimination]]></title>
            <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://www.bernardlaw.com/blog/2022/01/discrimination-based-on-accent-can-be-national-origin-discrimination/" />
            <id>https://www.bernardlaw.com/?p=47363</id>
            <updated>2021-11-30T16:21:11Z</updated>
            <published>2022-01-24T16:19:21Z</published>
					<taxo:topics><![CDATA[-]]></taxo:topics>
            <summary type="html"><![CDATA[The EEOC recognizes linguistic discrimination as national origin discrimination and prohibits “the denial of equal employment opportunity . . . because an individual has the . . . linguistic characteristics of a national group.” 29 C.F.R. § 1606. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has also recognized that discrimination based on manner of accent can be national origin discrimination. The…]]></summary>
			                <content type="html" xml:base="https://www.bernardlaw.com/blog/2022/01/discrimination-based-on-accent-can-be-national-origin-discrimination/"><![CDATA[The EEOC recognizes linguistic discrimination as national origin discrimination and prohibits "the denial of equal employment opportunity . . . because an individual has the . . . linguistic characteristics of a national group." 29 C.F.R. § 1606. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has also recognized that discrimination based on manner of accent can be national origin discrimination. The Sixth Circuit said “[w]e understand that ‘accent and national origin’ are overlapping concepts, and in some circumstances can be ‘inextricably intertwined.’ In one case, the Sixth Circuit affirmed a judgment for the plaintiff by observing that the evidence supported the district court's finding that "plaintiff was denied two positions within the Department because of her accent which flowed from her national origin." The Sixth Circuit, however, stated unlawful national origin discrimination does not occur when a plaintiff's accent affects his ability to perform the job effectively.

To determine if you have a claim for national origin discrimination, call Dale Bernard at 440-546-7500.]]></content>
						        </entry>
	        <entry>
            <author>
									                    <name>by The Bernard Law Firm</name>
				            </author>
            <title type="html"><![CDATA[The United States Supreme Court Determined That Title VII Of The Civil Rights Act Of 1964 Prohobits Employment Discrimination Against Gay, Lesbian And Transgender Employees]]></title>
            <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://www.bernardlaw.com/blog/2022/01/the-united-states-supreme-court-determined-that-title-vii-of-the-civil-rights-act-of-1964-prohobits-employment-discrimination-against-gay-lesbian-and-transgender-employees/" />
            <id>https://www.bernardlaw.com/?p=47357</id>
            <updated>2023-06-14T09:35:14Z</updated>
            <published>2022-01-10T16:16:20Z</published>
					<taxo:topics><![CDATA[-]]></taxo:topics>
            <summary type="html"><![CDATA[The United States Supreme Court held on June 15, 2020 in the case of Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 140 S. Ct. 1731  (2020) that the long standing 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimination against gay, lesbian and transgender employees, even though this federal law does not mention gay, lesbian or  transgender discrimination. How then did the U.S. Supreme Court arrive…]]></summary>
			                <content type="html" xml:base="https://www.bernardlaw.com/blog/2022/01/the-united-states-supreme-court-determined-that-title-vii-of-the-civil-rights-act-of-1964-prohobits-employment-discrimination-against-gay-lesbian-and-transgender-employees/"><![CDATA[The United States Supreme Court held on June 15, 2020 in the case of <em>Bostock v. Clayton Cty</em>., 140 S. Ct. 1731  (2020) that the long standing 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimination against gay, lesbian and transgender employees, even though this federal law does not mention gay, lesbian or  transgender discrimination. How then did the U.S. Supreme Court arrive at this holding?

The Supreme Court held that employers each violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 when they fired a long-time employee shortly after the employee revealed that he or she was homosexual or transgender because it was impossible to discriminate against a person for being homosexual or transgender without discriminating against that individual based on sex. Significantly, the Supreme Court added that, as enacted, Title VII prohibits all forms of discrimination because of sex, however they may manifest themselves or whatever other labels might attach to them.

The Court held it is not a defense for an employer to say it discriminates against both men and women because of sex. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 works to protect individuals of both sexes from discrimination, and does so equally, the Court stated. So, the Court reasoned, an employer who fires a woman, Hannah, because she is insufficiently feminine and also fires a man, Bob, for being insufficiently masculine may treat men and women as groups more or less equally. But, the Court emphasized, in both cases the employer fires an individual in part because of sex. Instead of avoiding Title VII exposure, this employer doubles it, the Court concluded.

A dissenting Justice argued that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment discrimination on any of five specified grounds: “race, color, religion, sex, [and] national origin.” and that neither “sexual orientation” nor “gender identity” appears on that list. For the past 45 years, the dissenting Justice reasoned, bills have been introduced in Congress to add “sexual orientation” to the list, and in recent years, bills have included “gender identity” as well, but to date, none has passed both Houses. Thus, how could the Court rule as it did?

The Court reasoned “[w]e agree that homosexuality and transgender status are distinct concepts from sex. But, as we’ve seen, discrimination based on homosexuality or transgender status necessarily entails discrimination based on sex; the first cannot happen without the second.”

Thus, the Court held that LGBTQ employment discrimination was really another form of sex or gender discrimination, which has been rendered unlawful in the workplace since 1964.

To determine if you have a claim for LGBTQ discrimination, call Dale Bernard at 440-546-7500.]]></content>
						        </entry>
	        <entry>
            <author>
									                    <name>by The Bernard Law Firm</name>
				            </author>
            <title type="html"><![CDATA[The Sixth Circuit Has Recognized Two Distinct Theories for Recovery Under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”): An FMLA Entitlement or Interference Theory and an FMLA Discrimination or Retaliation Theory]]></title>
            <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://www.bernardlaw.com/blog/2021/12/the-sixth-circuit-has-recognized-two-distinct-theories-for-recovery-under-the-family-and-medical-leave-act-fmla-an-fmla-entitlement-or-interference-theory-and-an-fmla-discriminati/" />
            <id>https://www.bernardlaw.com/?p=47342</id>
            <updated>2021-11-30T16:14:57Z</updated>
            <published>2021-12-27T16:13:43Z</published>
					<taxo:topics><![CDATA[-]]></taxo:topics>
            <summary type="html"><![CDATA[The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized “two distinct theories for recovery under the FMLA: (1) the ‘entitlement’ or ‘interference’ theory arising from 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a) (1); and (2) the ‘retaliation’ or ‘discrimination’ theory arising from 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2).” An employee seeking to bring a claim under the interference theory must prove that: (1) the employee was…]]></summary>
			                <content type="html" xml:base="https://www.bernardlaw.com/blog/2021/12/the-sixth-circuit-has-recognized-two-distinct-theories-for-recovery-under-the-family-and-medical-leave-act-fmla-an-fmla-entitlement-or-interference-theory-and-an-fmla-discriminati/"><![CDATA[The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized "two distinct theories for recovery under the FMLA: (1) the 'entitlement' or 'interference' theory arising from 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a) (1); and (2) the 'retaliation' or 'discrimination' theory arising from 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2)." An employee seeking to bring a claim under the interference theory must prove that: (1) the employee was an eligible employee, (2) the employer is defined as an employer under the FMLA, (3) the employee was entitled to leave under the FMLA, (4) the employee gave the employer notice of his or her intent to take leave, and (5) the employer denied the employee FMLA benefits or interfered with FMLA rights to which the employee was entitled.

The other theory for recovery is a claim of discrimination or retaliation. In order to pursue such a claim, an employee must show that: (1) he or she was engaged in a statutorily protected activity; (2) the employer knew he or she was exercising her FMLA rights; (3) the employee suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) a causal connection existed between the protected FMLA activity and the adverse employment action, according to the Sixth Circuit.

The Sixth Circuit held that "The burden of proof at the <em>prima facie </em>stage is minimal; all the plaintiff must do is put forth some credible evidence that enables the court to deduce that there is a causal connection between the retaliatory action and the protected activity."

Courts use the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis to evaluate FMLA discrimination and FMLA retaliation claims, stated the Sixth Circuit. If a Plaintiff demonstrates the <em>prima facie </em>elements of an FMLA retaliation claim, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for discharging plaintiff, the Sixth Circuit held. If the employer can set forth such reason(s), "the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the defendant's proffered reason is a pretext for unlawful discrimination", the Sixth Circuit held. Pretext means that the employer’s reason was a cover up for discrimination or retaliation. The Sixth Circuit has held that unlike FMLA interference claims, the employer's motive is an important part of analyzing an FMLA claim under an FMLA retaliation theory.

To determine if you have a claim for FMLA entitlement, FMLA interference,  FMLA discrimination or FMLA retaliation, call Dale Bernard at 440-546-7500.]]></content>
						        </entry>
	        <entry>
            <author>
									                    <name>by The Bernard Law Firm</name>
				            </author>
            <title type="html"><![CDATA[There Are Various Ways to Prove Pregnancy Discrimination, Depending on Whether an Express Statement of a Desire to Terminate an Employee Due to Her Pregnancy Was Made or Not]]></title>
            <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://www.bernardlaw.com/blog/2021/12/there-are-various-ways-to-prove-pregnancy-discrimination-depending-on-whether-an-express-statement-of-a-desire-to-terminate-an-employee-due-to-her-pregnancy-was-made-or-not/" />
            <id>https://www.bernardlaw.com/?p=47340</id>
            <updated>2021-11-30T16:12:08Z</updated>
            <published>2021-12-13T16:10:15Z</published>
					<taxo:topics><![CDATA[-]]></taxo:topics>
            <summary type="html"><![CDATA[Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against any individual because of her pregnancy. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has held an employee can establish a prima facie case of pregnancy discrimination by presenting “direct evidence” of discriminatory intent. What is direct evidence? The Sixth Circuit stated “[A] facially discriminatory employment policy or a corporate decision maker’s express statement of…]]></summary>
			                <content type="html" xml:base="https://www.bernardlaw.com/blog/2021/12/there-are-various-ways-to-prove-pregnancy-discrimination-depending-on-whether-an-express-statement-of-a-desire-to-terminate-an-employee-due-to-her-pregnancy-was-made-or-not/"><![CDATA[Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against any individual because of her pregnancy. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has held an employee can establish a prima facie case of pregnancy discrimination by presenting “direct evidence” of discriminatory intent. What is direct evidence? The Sixth Circuit stated "[A] facially discriminatory employment policy or a corporate decision maker's express statement of a desire to remove employees in the protected group is direct evidence of discriminatory intent." Is it therefore necessary to have a statement of a desire to terminate an employee because of her pregnancy? The answer is no.

The Sixth Circuit held "[i]n order to make out a prima facie case of pregnancy discrimination using the McDonnell Douglas indirect method, [a plaintiff] must show (1) that she was pregnant, (2) that she was qualified for her job, (3) that she was subjected to an adverse employment action, and (4) that there is a nexus between her pregnancy and the adverse employment action."

If the employee is successful in demonstrating the prima facie elements of her pregnancy discrimination claim, she has "create[d] a rebuttable presumption of discrimination," and, at the second step of the McDonnell Douglas framework, the burden shifted to the former employer "to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for taking the challenged employment action," held the Sixth Circuit.

If the employer rebuts the presumption of pregnancy discrimination raised by the pregnancy employee’s <em>prima facie</em> case, the question remains whether, under the burden-shifting framework of <em>McDonnell Douglas</em>, the pregnant employee then can produce adequate evidence demonstrating that the employer’s proffered reason was a “pretext” for discrimination," the Sixth Circuit stated.

The pregnant employee can then establish pretext by showing that the employer's proffered reasons (1) have no basis in fact; (2) did not actually motivate the action; or (3) were insufficient to warrant the action.".

To determine if you have a claim for pregnancy discrimination, call Dale Bernard at 440-546-7500.]]></content>
						        </entry>
	        <entry>
            <author>
									                    <name>by The Bernard Law Firm</name>
				            </author>
            <title type="html"><![CDATA[The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals’ Recently Reiterated the Elements of a Sexual Harassment Claim]]></title>
            <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://www.bernardlaw.com/blog/2021/11/the-sixth-circuit-court-of-appeals-recently-reiterated-the-elements-of-a-sexual-harassment-claim/" />
            <id>https://www.bernardlaw.com/?p=47335</id>
            <updated>2021-11-24T18:31:32Z</updated>
            <published>2021-11-24T18:30:41Z</published>
					<taxo:topics><![CDATA[-]]></taxo:topics>
            <summary type="html"><![CDATA[The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Cincinnati, which reviews appeals from decisions made by federal courts in Ohio and neighboring states, including federal courts sitting in Cleveland, Akron, Toledo and Youngstown, reiterated during June 2021 the elements of a claim of hostile work environment based on sexual harassment. The Sixth Circuit held to prevail on a Title VII claim…]]></summary>
			                <content type="html" xml:base="https://www.bernardlaw.com/blog/2021/11/the-sixth-circuit-court-of-appeals-recently-reiterated-the-elements-of-a-sexual-harassment-claim/"><![CDATA[The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Cincinnati, which reviews appeals from decisions made by federal courts in Ohio and neighboring states, including federal courts sitting in Cleveland, Akron, Toledo and Youngstown, reiterated during June 2021 the elements of a claim of hostile work environment based on sexual harassment.

The Sixth Circuit held to prevail on a Title VII claim of hostile work environment based on sexual harassment, the female “employee must show that: (1) she was a member of a protected class; (2) she was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) the harassment complained of was based on sex; (4) the charged sexual harassment created a hostile work environment; and (5) the employer is liable."

The Sixth Circuit held that the standard for employer liability differs depending on whether the sexual harassment was carried out by a supervisor or coworker: “In the case of a sexually harassing supervisor, the employer is vicariously liable for the hostile work environment.” But, the Court said, when the sexual harassment is committed by a coworker, the employer is liable only ‘if it knew or should have known of the charged sexual harassment and failed to implement prompt and appropriate corrective action.’ ”

To find liability for sexual harassment, the Sixth Circuit determined that the employer's response to a coworker's sexual harassment must "manifest indifference or unreasonableness in light of the facts the employer knew or should have known.” The Sixth Circuit held an employer’s response is generally adequate "if it is 'reasonably calculated to end the sexual harassment.'" The Sixth Circuit went on to state that there are no hard and fast rules but that "[t]he appropriate corrective response will vary according to the severity and persistence of the alleged harassment." The Sixth Circuit explained that "[s]teps that would 'establish a base level of reasonably appropriate corrective action' may include promptly initiating an investigation [,] . . . 'speaking with the specific individuals identified’ in the complaint, ‘following up with the complainant,’ and ‘reporting the harassment to others in management.’”

To determine if you have a claim for sexual harassment hostile work environment, call Dale Bernard at 440-546-7500.]]></content>
						        </entry>
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